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Abstract 
The paper examines the inflation targeting regime in the context of transition economies. Recent years 
have witnessed an increasing number of central banks in these countries moving towards the 
implementation of inflation targeting regimes. However, the success of such a regime depends largely on 
the degree to which certain general requirements are met. As experience in a number of transition 
economies has shown so far, targeting inflation is not an easy task. The ongoing restructuring process in 
these economies makes the inflation forecasting process more difficult and introduces an additional 
source of uncertainty in the system. By unequivocally choosing inflation as a nominal anchor the central 
banks could face potential dilemmas if, for example, exchange rate appreciated too much under the 
pressure of massive capital inflows. The paper presents the broad framework in which inflation targeting 
could operate efficiently and attempts to assess the extent to which such a regime, when applied to 
transition economies, could fit into this framework.        
JEL Classification: E52, E60. 
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years a number of central banks have adopted IT as a monetary policy 
regime. There is now a large literature that deals with IT; see among others, Bernanke et 
al. (1999), Taylor (1999),  Truman (2003). The move towards IT started in the 1980’s, 
after the period of high inflation caused by the oil shocks. The inflation adversity that 
prevailed during that period made monetary institutions to voice their strong 
commitment to fighting inflation. Recent developments in economic theory 
strengthened the case for switching towards IT. The basic macroeconomic framework 
of the New Neoclassical Synthesis (Goodfriend and King, 1997) has provided a 
theoretical foundation for models employed in monetary policy analysis. These models 
seem to suggest that a central bank (CB) should pursue an activist policy to target 
inflation. It has to be said however, that it is too early to judge how well the IT 
framework is working. The rationale for IT is essentially a long-term one and the 
inflation targeters’ experience is too limited yet in order to provide a definite assessment 
of its success or failure. 
                                                 
1 This paper has been completed within the framework of a project sponsored by the UN/ECE; 
it draws on a previous research undertaken by Daniel Daianu, Laurian Lungu and Radu Vranceanu (2004). 
We thank Naveen Srinivasan for helpful comments.The paper benefited also from the discussions Daniel 
Daianu had with the former governor of the National Bank of Hungary, Gyorgy Suranyi, Thomas 
Reininger (National Bank of Austria) and Max Watson, previously with the IMF. An early version of this 
paper was published as a WDI working paper, November 2004.   
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In a comprehensive study, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) argue that 
inflation targeting proved to be in general a successful policy. The authors claim that IT 
reinforced accountability, credibility, resilience to external shocks and helped high 
inflation countries to reduce inflation to normal levels (most of them were emerging 
economies). Yet they point that, at the end of the process, inflation in IT countries is 
not lower than in non-IT countries. Along the same lines Ball and Sheridan (2004) show 
that, once corrected for the initial conditions, the differences between inflation targeters 
and non-targeters are minor. Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2003) also argue that average 
inflation in both emerging and developed economies fell after the adoption of IT. Other 
authors such as Friedman (2004) contend that IT, as practiced in reality in the low 
inflation countries, actually obscures the communication of the central bank’s goals. 
Moreover, Friedman (2004) argues that this monetary policy framework is not as 
transparent as claimed by most IT advocates, casting doubts on the benefits brought 
about by the adoption of IT. 
A recent analysis made by the IMF
2 concludes that IT appears to have generated 
a lower inflation environment in countries that decided to adopt this monetary policy 
framework. However, it is not clear to what extent the increase in globalisation and a 
better understanding of how monetary policy works in developed economies helped in 
the creation of such an environment. Moreover, the analysis makes inferences on the 
group of IT countries from emerging markets as a whole without distinguishing the 
subgroup of transition economies. Such a distinction would be useful given that 
transition economies face special circumstances – expectations in these countries are 
driven by EU accession and Maastricht criteria impose additional constraints on the 
implementation of monetary policy.      
This paper examines the inflation targeting regime in the context of transition 
economies. The success of such a regime depends largely on the degree to which certain 
general requirements are met. As experience in a number of transition economies has 
shown so far, targeting inflation is not an easy task. The ongoing restructuring process 
in these economies makes the inflation forecasting process more difficult and introduces 
an additional source of uncertainty into the system. Moreover, additional constraints 
imposed either by the Maastricht criteria or the requirement to join the ERM II prior to 
the euro adoption complicate matters further. By unequivocally choosing inflation as a 
nominal anchor the central banks could face potential dilemmas if, for example, the 
exchange rate appreciated too much following capital inflows. The idea of the paper is 
to present the broad framework in which inflation targeting could operate efficiently 
and provide an assessment of the extent to which such a regime, when applied to 
transition economies, could fit into this framework. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basics of the IT 
concept and mentions several requirements that are a prerequisite for its successful 
implementation in practice. Section 3 outlines the European context of monetary policy 
management. Section 4 addresses several issues regarding the implementation of the IT 
regime in transition economies and provides a brief account about IT experience in 
three transition economies, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Section 5 
concludes. 
                                                 
2 IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005.  
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2.  Inflation Targeting: Theory and Policy 
Historically, to achieve their main objectives (most often, low inflation and, 
eventually, sustained growth) numerous central banks targeted some intermediate 
variable, such as a monetary aggregate or the exchange rate. Success with this method 
requires that (a) the central bank were able to control the intermediate variable and (b) 
that there is a stable relationship between the intermediate target variable and the 
ultimate objectives. For instance, it was sometimes claimed that the Bundesbank and 
Swiss National Bank outstanding record of low inflation can be accounted for by their 
policy of targeting a monetary aggregate (monetary targeting). Other scholars underlined 
that in its deeds the Bundesbank set more emphasis on inflation forecasts than on the 
monetary aggregate, and also that the SNB was concerned with many other indicators 
(Gerlach and Svensson, 2003). 
In recent years, several governments in developed and developing countries 
decided to implement IT. Pioneers were New Zealand (1990), Canada (1991), Chile 
(1991), Israel (1992), United Kingdom (1992), Australia (1993) and Sweden (1993). In 
Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia claim to 
have adopted this system (after 1998). Under the IT system, the central bank manages 
monetary policy instruments with the direct goal of containing inflation over the 
medium run. In this setup, inflation becomes the overriding goal of monetary policy. All 
the other indicators (output gap, money stock growth, the exchange rate, etc) become 
auxiliary variables; the central bank will take them into account only if this information 
helps it to improve its inflation forecast. 
Experience with monetary policy management in the developed countries has 
shown that the impact of monetary policy changes on inflation works its effects with a 
significant lag (at least nine months, and up to two years for a full impact). To make 
things simple, when central bankers undertake a change in the main instrument at time 
t, the effects on inflation will be felt much later (let us say, after 6 quarters, that is at 
time t+6). Therefore, if the central bank wants to achieve a quantitative inflation target, 
it must act in a forward-looking manner, that is, it must decide today on the basis of a 
reasonable forecast of inflation at time t+x (x being the number of quarters in the 
forecast). 
It should be emphasised that under IT, inflation forecasts are contingent upon 
the central bank’s view on the transmission mechanism, the current state of the 
economy and a planned path for the instrument. Complex econometric modelling and 
statistical inference building on high quality data and economic information is needed in 
order to produce reliable forecasts. The quality of the forecast varies from one central 
bank to another - it depends on their expertise, experience with forecasting, and 
available data. No doubt that the better the forecast precision, the better will be the 
public image of the central banker. 
In theory, the instrument’s planned path might be seen as the solution to a 
dynamic programming problem, where the bank has to find the instrument path that 
brings inflation close to the target while minimizing output volatility over the chosen 
time horizon (Svensson, 1999; 2000). In practice, the Bank might follow some simple 
decision rule consistent with its medium run objectives. The parameters of the rule 
depend on the quality of the forecast. 
In Figure 2.1. we describe how a central banker takes its decision under the IT 
policy regime. At date t, the policymaker must decide on the instrument (interest rate).  
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He knows the previous inflation path and, given its knowledge of the economy, has an 
idea of the future path for inflation. The conditional forecast on the inflation rate ￿, 
calculated for x quarters ahead is denoted by E(￿t+x|It), where It is the information set 
available at the date of the forecast. Notice that the initial forecast is obtained for an 
unchanged instrument (and that a change in the instrument would allow to obtain a 
different forecast). 
Figure 2.1 describes a situation where although at time t the inflation rate falls 
below the target, in the medium run (8 quarters ahead), the inflation forecast, obtained 
for a constant instrument value, exceeds the target. In this case, the policymaker must 
tighten its monetary policy (although at time t inflation is below the target).  
 
Figure 2.1.  IT – the basic logic 
 
 
From this simple (hypothetical) example, it can be seen how important it is for 
the policymaker to dispose of reliable forecasts. A reliable forecast implies that over a 
long period the average forecast error must be zero and the variance of the forecast 
error must be as low as possible. Obviously, such a forecast can be obtained only if the 
policymaker has a good knowledge of the monetary transmission mechanism, and of the 
economy as a whole. 
From the point of view of implementation, a basic prerequisite for inflation 
targeting is the central bank’s full autonomy and independence. Also, the inflation 
targeting framework needs to define a relevant price index; in general, it is a traditional 
consumer price index. The bank has then to decide on the instruments it wants to use. 
In the last years, central banks all over the world chose to have a say on short term 
interest rates, mainly through reverse-repo operations carried out in the money market. 
Thus, the basic instrument is some repo-refinancing interest rate. At regular intervals the 
CB will adjust the main instrument so as to bring the inflation forecast as close as 
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A few influential economists are enthusiastic about this monetary policy 
framework (see e.g. Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; Bernanke 2003). They argue that such 
a policy regime allows ruling out the inflation bias connected with time inconsistency. 
The policymaker’s accountability should be quite high under IT since his performance 
can be directly measured, for instance by the deviation between actual inflation and the 
target. Transparency is taken a step further since the forecasting method (econometric 
model) is made available to the public. In general, IT central banks communicate very 
much on their policy and forecasting methods. This helps private agents to obtain better 
inflation expectations, which should entail lower economic fluctuations. 
Although most inflation targeters share some of the features mentioned above, 
in practice there is considerable variation in the specifics (for a characterisation of IT see 
for example Kuttner, 2004). In practice, central banks adopt either a formal approach or 
a more flexible one. The distinction between the two is that the former entails the 
specification of an inflation target while the latter, so called “just do it”, does not. Thus, 
it looks as if the “just do it” approach leaves more room for manoeuvre for the CB by 
not binding it to hit a specific inflation target. However, CB’s credibility is bound to play 
an important role in the successful implementation of monetary policy. 
3.    The European Context of Monetary Policy Management 
According to the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) which is now an integral part of the 
Treaty on the European Union,
3 all the new EU members must eventually join the Euro 
Area. In this context, the monetary institutions in transition economies are expected to 
be able to cope with the constraints of the ERM II. The Convention for the ERM II 
(September 1st, 1998) states that each euro candidate will have to define a central rate 
against the euro together with a standard fluctuation band of ±15% (a narrower band 
may be negotiated on a bilateral basis). Euro candidates should keep their currency 
within the ERM II for at least two years before accession.
4 Given these elements, it is of 
interest to have a look first at the European monetary context, namely the ECB’s 
monetary policy management. 
3.1 The ECB’s monetary policy management 
The ECB was set up in 1999 to manage monetary policy within the EMU. The 
ECB’s main mission is “to maintain price stability” and “safeguard the value of the 
euro”. In the medium run the ECB has to keep inflation below 2%, as measured by the 
HCPI. Although the ECB is also highly independent and autonomous (its range of 
instruments is impressive, the governments’ bail-out is banned, and member country 
governments’ political influence over the Bank is weak), it is not of the IT type. Unlike 
genuine IT countries and more like the Fed, the ECB shares only a moderate concern 
for transparency. It is not clear how the Governing Council decides on interest rates 
given that the internal discussions are secret. The ECB does not issue an official 
                                                 
3 See the Treaty on European Union at the web address: www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties. 
4 See: "The Eurosystem and the EU enlargement process", ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2000; "The ECB and the 
accession process", Speech by Willem F. Duisenberg, delivered at the Frankfurt European Banking Congress, 
November 23, 2001, www.ecb.int/key/01/sp011123.htm; Niels Thygesen, "The path to the euro for the 
enlargement countries", Speech delivered at the European Parliament on May 8, 2002, 
www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/econ/ pdf/emu/speeches/20020521/thygesen.pdf; "Central Europe and the euro: 
up for adoption", The Economist, June 1, 2002. The text of the "Conventions and Procedures for the ERM2" on 
September 11, 1998 is available at: www.banque-france.fr/gb/euro/bce/cpresse/2c.htm.  
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inflation forecast. That is, the ECB regime appears to be closer to the “just-do-it” 
behaviour of the US Fed than to the full-fledged IT system of the central banks of the 
UK or Sweden. 
As in the US, the EMU monetary policy aims at flexibility so as to be able to 
address, in an efficient way, the various potential threats to price stability, including 
exceptional events (deflation, war, terrorist attacks, imports price shocks, stock market 
major crises, etc.).
5  
The ECB flexibility of monetary policy is reflected in the asymmetry of inflation 
target. By imposing a ceiling of 2% for inflation, the conduct of monetary policy could 
give confusing signals to market participants in particular during circumstances of zero 
inflation or when prices are falling. In addition the ECB has not specified a fixed policy 
horizon, which allows for the necessary flexibility in responding – potentially more 
appropiately - to economic shocks of a specific tye. 
Moreover, the ECB follows a two-pillar strategy which builds on two types of 
analyses, an economic and a monetary one. While the economic analysis is based 
broadly on the outlook of price developments and of the risks to price stability in the 
euro area as a whole, the monetary pillar sets a reference value for money growth (M3). 
The two-pillar strategy which the ECB pursues thus allows more discretion in the 
management of monetary policy. This happens because the ECB could justify its 
monetary policy decisions to the public based on a range of economic and monetary 
developments. 
3.2 Monetary Policy Practice at the Bank of England    
The BofE has introduced the IT regime in 1992. In January 2004, the UK 
replaced the RPIX price index (which excludes mortgage payments) with the HCPI 
(which includes them) and which is the official index of the ECB. The Bank aims at 
holding the inflation rate within a narrow band around the 2% central value. Because 
monetary policy works its effect with several lags, under IT the central bank takes a 
forward looking stance over inflation developments; in greater detail, the BofE focuses 
on inflation developments over a two year period. In order to implement this policy, it 
makes use of forecasts obtained from various models. Although for the forecasting 
process there is a so-called core macroeconometric model of the UK economy, the 
BofE also uses the forecasts obtained from several other smaller models. These are 
intended to capture and explain some phenomena that are rather difficult to assess by 
simply using the core model. For example they could offer a better understanding of the 
recent past or, sometimes, they could evaluate new scenarios. They are also used to test 
the appropriateness of assumptions made about the driving processes used in the core 
model. The models’ output are a useful tool because they facilitate a better 
comprehension of how the economy works, allowing for empirical quantification and 
thus helping to gain a better understanding of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. Aided by the forecast output of these models, the BofE’s Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) makes a judgement about the future potential developments of 
inflation and output growth. Every month, the BofE publishes a two-year ahead 
forecast for the annual CPI and RPIX inflation and four-quarter growth rate of GDP, 
                                                 
5 The speech by Allan Greenspan, “Risk and uncertainty in monetary policy” on January 3, 2004 is a 
convincing plea in favor of flexibility and adaptive monetary policy management. See 
www.federalreserve.gov/boardocs/speeches/2004/20040103/default.htm.   
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under the assumption of constant short-term UK interest rates, in the form of a fan-
charts. The forecast process at the BofE takes several steps. First, there is a meeting 
between the MPC and the BofE staff aimed at establishing the key assumptions 
together with a risk assessment. These are then incorporated into the BofE’s economic 
models by the forecasting team in order to obtain a draft forecast. The draft forecast is 
analysed by the MPC which may require changes subject to revised assumptions and 
new information. Finally the forecast is fine-tuned by the MPC in response to the latest 
economic developments. All monetary policy decisions are interpreted and motivated in 
the light of these forecasts. The basic principle is that a deviation of the forecast from 
target requires a current intervention of the Bank: when the forecast exceeds the target, 
monetary policy is tightened and vice-versa. 
3.3 The Baltic Countries 
The Baltic countries stand out from the group of inflation targeters. Notably, the 
central banks of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all adopted some sort of a currency 
board arrangement. With the three countries committed to join the EMU as soon as 
possible it looks unlikely that they will change their current monetary policy framework 
before adopting the euro. The group of Baltic countries has managed to contain 
inflation although after joining the EU in 2004 the accession costs pushed up inflation 
by an average of 3 percentage points in all Baltic countries (see Figure 3.1 below).  
  












Although a fixed exchanged rate mechanism is successful in anchoring inflation 
expectations it might be detrimental to the country’s competitiveness if fluctuations in 
the value of the euro, to which the Baltic countries currencies are pegged, occur in 
international financial markets. Thus, the loss of monetary policy indepedence could 
affect the central bank’s response to shocks and prevent the timely adjustment of other 
macroeconomic variables. Moreover, higher commodities and energy prices could lead 
to imported inflation, a phenomenon which a monetary authority that targets a fixed 
exchange rate can do little against. 
On the benefits side, for small open economies, like the Baltic countries, an 
exchange rate strategy could help in smoothing out global financial and commodity 
markets shocks while reducing foreign exchange rate volatility. And the latter is an  
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important element as the exchange rate channel affects consumer price dynamics 
considerably in all Baltic countries. 
Given that the Baltic countries have been pursuing a pegged exchange rate long 
before they joined the EU in 2004, it is not surprising that all three of them adopted the 
ERM II mechanism soon after becoming EU members.      
The central banks of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia have also moved towards IT (see next section). However, there is still some 
way to go until the performance of IT in these countries will be close to that of more 
advanced economies. 
While monetary authorities in the new EU members and candidate countries
6 
have adopted different monetary policy frameworks, because of the Maastricht criteria 
requirements they all face similar concerns in the medium term. Thus, apart from low 
inflation, an objective which all central banks aim at, the stability of the exchange rate is 
also one of the variables closely monitored by the monetary authorities. As investment 
opportunities in the new EU members and the candidate countries have increased, so 
did the volume of foreign inflows. In reply to the increased demand for domestic 
currency most central banks have been forced to resort to sterilised interventions. As a 
consequence their foreign currency reserves are much higher than those in other 
developed countries. For instance, Figure 3.2 below shows the ratio of foreign reserves 
to M1 at the end of 2004.
7  
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Data Sources : Eurostat and authors calculations 
 
The share of foreign reserves in M1 in EUR12 countries is less than 10% while 
for the UK, one of the countries considered to have best IT practice, it is a meagre 
3.4%. In contrast, in the Baltic countries the ratio stands at 50-60%, not surprising given 
their pegged exchange rate agreements. Bulgaria, which also implements a fixed 
exchange rate policy has a much higher ratio, around 130%. One would have expected 
this ratio to be lower in the IT countries. In fact, in all Eastern European IT countries 
this is exactly the opposite. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia all have 
                                                 
6 Candidate countries are Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. Barring any unexpected developments the first 
two countries should join the EU in January 2007.Croatia still needs to complete its EU accession talks. 
7 For the current purpose a more appropiate measure of the money supply would have been the monetary 
base, M0. However, given some data availability constraints the choice of M1 ensures direct 
comparisons between individual country ratios.   
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higher foreign reserves to M1 ratios than countries that implement a fixed exchange rate 
regime. In Romania, which is not depicted in Figure 3.2, foreign reserves covered 
almost 2.3 times the money supply M1 at the end of 2006 
8! Thus, paradoxically, the 
monetary conditions in the IT countries are more stringent than those in the countries 
with pegged exchange rate regimes.  
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b show the annual increase in foreign currency reserves in 
the non-IT and the IT countries respectively.  
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Data Source : IMF, except Romania for which data is from the NBR monthly bulletins. 
 
The accumulation of foreign reserves does not seem to vary markedly between 
the two groups of countries. However, over the last months the trend in the growth rate 
of foreign reserves seemed to have come down from the high rates of 2002-2003. One 
exception is Romania where the annual growth rate of foreign reserves stands at around 
                                                 
8 And around 3 times the base money, M0.  
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40%. To avoid an excessive appreciation of the domestic currency, the Leu, the NBR 
continues to sterilise large volumes of capital inflows and then to absorb the resulting 
excess liquidity from the money market. Because of its ERM II participation, Hungary 
has been also forced to defend the trading band of the forint. The rate of change in 
foreign reserves is more volatile in Hungary than in other country. The January 2003 
episode, when the NBH defended the forint against a speculative attack can be singled 
out, as a massive increase of 50% in foreign reserves was needed to fend off the attack. 
But, while targeting inflation, other central banks in EE have made routine interventions 
in the foreign exchange markets. The CNB also used to intervene in the foreign 
exchange markets quite often in order to counter upward pressure on the exchange 
rate
9. And so has done the central bank of Slovakia.  
At various points in time all central banks in EE have been confronted with 
large capital inflows, some of which were speculative in nature. And these occurrences 
are likely to happen again in the near future if inconsistencies in macroeconomic policies 
emerge. To avoid excessive appreciation/depreciation of domestic currencies the central 
banks have tended to resort to sterilisation procedures – which led to the presence of 
chronic excess liquidity. Thus, in EE countries the relevance of reverse-repo 
transactions is much higher compared to developed countries (where the repo 
operations are common). While in some countries, like the Czech Republic or Poland, 
repo transactions have started to be used more intensively, the workings of monetary 
transmission mechanism is yet to be fully understood by the monethary authorities in 
order to make a better use of this monetary policy instrument.  
4.  Inflation Targeting in Transition Economies, Issues and Experience  
4.1 Is the IT Framework Solely Responsible for the Disinflation Process? 
Given their post communist experience with high inflation it is not surprising 
that several central banks in EE have become strong adherents of IT. Following a 
period in which most of them pursued a monetary policy aimed at stabilising the 
exchange rate, subsequently they turned to IT. Although the EE central banks which 
follow IT tend to stress the importance of pursuing this monetary policy framework in 
achieving low inflation, this need not necessarily hold true. Inflation in almost all 
Central and Eastern European countries has been following a downward trend (from 
the high levels of inflation experienced after 1990) – irrespective of the choice of 
monetary arrangements and regimes employed by the central banks of these countries. 
Clearly the recent low global inflation environment has made it easier for the EE 
countries to control domestic inflation.
10 This argument aside, it is not immediately 
apparent what the results of implementing a different monetary policy framework by the 
current IT countries would have been.  
In general, it was the implementation of sensible domestic fiscal and monetary 
policies in transition economies, aided by favourable external inflation developments, 
that led to a low inflation environment. If these policies continue to be pursued 
responsibly there are no reasons to think why the inflation rate could not be maintained 
                                                 
9 See OECD Economic Surveys: Slovak Republic 2005 and Disyatat and Galati (2005).  
10 Indeed, this is a view shared by a number of central bankers and economists from both EE and non-
EE countries that target inflation as well.  
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at the low levels already achieved in most of these countries even in the absence of a 
genuine IT regime.  
As Table 4.1 below shows, countries that pursued different monetary policy 
frameworks – such as the Baltic countries or Bulgaria, for instance, have also achieved 
low inflation.  
 
 Table 4.1 Average Annual Inflation (%) 
Year  Cz_R  HU  PO  SL  SK  ET  LV  LT  BU  RO 
1999  2.1 10.0  7.3 6.1 10.4  3.1 2.1 1.5 2.6 45.4 
2000  3.9 9.8 10.1  8.9 12.3  3.9 2.6 1.1 10.3  46.3 
2001  4.7 9.2 5.5 8.6 7.2 5.6 2.5 1.5 7.4 34.8 
2002  1.8 5.5 1.9 7.5 3.5 3.6 2.0 0.4 5.8 22.7 
2003  0.1 4.4 0.8 5.7 8.4 1.4 2.9 -1.1  2.4 15.4 
2004  2.8 6.8 3.6 3.7 7.5 3.0 6.2 1.2 6.2 12.0 
2005  1.8 3.6 2.1 2.5 2.8 4.1 6.9 2.7 5.0 9.1 
2006  2.5 3.9 1.0 2.5 4.3 4.4 6.6 3.8 7.3 6.7 
 Source: Eurostat and Authors Calculations 
 
Inflation targeting in transition economies has been a more challenging task than 
in developed economies. As experience with IT in transition economies shows, the 
central banks in these countries often missed inflation targets by a significant amount. 
Jonas and Mishkin (2003) look at the potential difficulties and evaluate the outcome in 
the three East European countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that claim 
to use the IT system. They conclude that although the progress of disinflation has been 
good, the relatively high level of uncertainty in these countries makes it relatively 
difficult to predict inflation over the medium term – as required by the IT approach. 
This is not a minor shortcoming. In the developed countries, adoption of IT 
implies that the central bank dispose of the technical ability to: 
•  have a reliable conditional forecast of inflation (6-8 quarters ahead); and 
•  know how to adapt its instruments so as to bring the forecast close to the target.  
All the benefits which derive from IT in terms of accountability and credibility 
stem from these conditions. Obtaining a reliable conditional forecast is a very difficult 
task – and the ECB itself did not accept this challenge! What if the forecast is wrong? 
Figure 2.1 proves the point. If the true forecast falls below the target, the policymaker 
would tighten monetary policy when he should loosen it. The relationship between the 
instruments is in general assumed to be known but this relationship changes 
continuously in developing economies.  
Given the fact that the risks of getting wrong forecasts – and thus missing 
inflation targets – in a transition economy are quite large, the central bank’s credibility 
may be adversely affected by the adoption of IT. By adopting a rigid framework for 
monetary policy management in the context where the criteria for the well functioning 
of this framework are not fulfilled, the central bank’s credibility can only be damaged. 
In a recent paper Stone (2003) shows that, although a series of developing 
countries pretend to practice IT, in reality they are not able to meet their inflation  
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targets. The paramount policy issue in these countries is then whether the central bank 
should pre-commit itself to a single nominal anchor – namely inflation. The same 
question is posed for the particular case of transition economies. Is the formal IT 
regime, as it is claimed to be implemented by the central banks in transition economies, 
best suited, given current economic circumstances? And if it is not, what would the 
alternative be? To answer the first question one would have to look at the particular 
issues that might obstruct the implementation of the IT regime in transition economies. 
Here we look in particular at the preliminary IT experience in three transition countries, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, mainly because of the existing  track record – 
albeit small – these countries have in this respect. A comprehensive analysis of the 
economic developments that led to the introduction of IT in these countries is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
11 However, for evaluation purposes a brief overview of the IT 
experience in these countries could be a useful exercise. This would also help in 
identifying some of the potential challenges for monetary policy that lie ahead. 
4.2 IT Experience in EE Countries 
  Hungary. Officially, Hungary launched inflation targeting in mid-2001. 
The first target band was +/-1% centred around a target rate of 7%. by the end of 2004 
the initially announced target band was 3.5% +/- 1%. With inflation pressures rising in 
early 2004 the NBH revised upwards its end-2005 target band to 4% +/- 1% with the 
central parity target at the end 2006 falling by 0.5%. It is worth noticing that, while 
targeting inflation, the NBH aims simultaneously at maintaining the forint-euro 
exchange rate within a +/-15% band, which in effect emulates the ERM-II regime. 
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Czech Republic. The Czech Republic adopted the IT framework in December 
1997 and had an initial band of 5.5-6.5% and a one-year time horizon. Initially, the 
Czech National Bank (CNB) chose to target core inflation but moved to CPI in 
December 2001. Starting with January 2002 the CNB adopted a 4-year inflation forecast 
period in which targeted inflation is expected to fall gradually within a band from 3-5% 
to 2-4% by the end of December 2005. From January 2006 the CNB announced that it 
would  target an inflation rate of 3% until the country joins the euro area. 
                                                 
11 For this see Jonas and Mishkin (2003).  
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Poland. In Poland the NBP set a short-term inflation target within the 8-8.5% 
range in June 1998.  Subsequently different targets were set at the end of each year. At 
the time of the announcement that inflation targeting is to be implemented, the NBP 
was still maintaining an exchange rate band. This was widened gradually before allowing 
the zloty to float freely in April 2000. For the end-2005 and 2006 the target inflation 
band was 2.5% +/- 1% and in the medium term monetary policy aims at keeping annual 
inflation as close as possible to 2.5%.  
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Prior to year 2006 the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) used to signal to the 
public its monetary policy bias. This was considered to limit the flexibility of monetary 
policy and therefore, starting from 2006 the MPC announced it would communicate an 
assessment of a sum of factors that could affect future inflation instead.
12    
 
                                                 
12 Inflation Report, January 2006, National Bank of Poland.  
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Romania. The National Bank of Romania (NBR) announced its official 
adoption of the IT regime in August 2005. However, inflation targets – for a three-year 
time span –  were made public long before that. Initially, the end-2005 inflation target 
was set at 7%. This was later changed to a target band of +/- 1% centred around 7.5%. 
Actual inflation proved to be 8.6%, falling just above the upper limit of the band. In 
2006 however, helped by a strong domestic currency appreciation, actual inflation was 
4.7% and fell within the NBR’s inflation target band of 4-6%. For 2007 the NBR’s 
inflation target band is set at 3-5%.
13  
 
Slovakia. Subsequent to joining the EU in 2004 the government and the 
National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) announced a strategy for adopting the euro by 2009. 
Under this economic strategy, a new monetary policy framework – defined as ‘inflation 
targeting in the conditions of ERM II’ – was established. The inflation targets 
announced by the NBS for 2006 and 2007 are asymmetric, below 2.5 and 2% 
respectively. However, these could prove to be ambitious if the current level of high oil 
prices is maintained. In the last quarter of 2005 alone inflation rose from 2 to 3.9%.   
  
From Figure 4.1-4.3 it can be easily noticed that three central banks with more 
experience with IT (ie Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) have had limited success 
in hitting inflation targets
14. This is not surprising given the challenges IT poses in 
transition economies. The next section highlights a series of policy implications for 
Eastern European countries that target inflation.      
4.3 Policy Implications for IT Countries in EE 
In general, countries that moved towards IT in EE have done so because this 
operational framework of monetary policy was considered to be the best alternative. 
Monetary targets were pursued either directly or indirectly in early 1990’s by Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Poland and Czech Republic among others. However, given the instability of 
money demand most of these countries moved gradually, in a more or less formal way, 
towards exchange rate targeting. The adoption of this monetary policy framework 
enhanced central banks’ credibility in fighting inflation since the objectives of monetary 
policy itself were easier to understand by the public. As inflation rates were falling 
towards single digits it became apparent that the need for structural adjustment required 
the adoption of a more flexible approach to exchange rate policies. Apart from this, an 
exchange rate peg or target band is prone to currency attacks, a serious risk, considering 
that a combination of high interest rate differentials (compared to the EU countries in 
particular) and a tendency for a domestic currency appreciation existed in these 
countries. With nominal income or price level targeting not favoured for different 
                                                 
13 In early 2006, at the time of its inflation targets announcement the NBR also acknowledged that its 
2006 inflation target would, very likely, be missed. The NBR’s decision to aim for an inflation rate 
which even the NBR considered to be unrealistic is questionable since the public’s inflation expectations 
– the ones that matter – are not influenced by the pre-announced inflation target anymore. This could 
cast some doubts on  its overall approach to IT management. Paradoxically, subsequent economic 
developments – in particular the strong appreciation of the RON caused by strong inflows of foreign 
capital and increased demand for foreign products, made inflation to fall within the target band.        
14 Given the short time period  which elapsed since both Romania and Slovakia moved officially towards 
IT it is too early to assess the success of IT regime in these countries.  
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reasons,
15 the move towards inflation targeting seemed particularly appealing because of 
its apparent simplicity. While such a way to conduct monetary policy is more suitable 
for free market economies with a proven track record, its adoption by the Eastern 
European economies – which are still undergoing structural changes – could face a 
number of challenges.
16 
Firstly, the source of the shocks that hit the Eastern European economies is 
rather uncertain. A central bank would adopt a different course for monetary policy if it 
knew that the economy was subject to a demand shock rather than a supply shock. The 
difficulty of disentangling the source of the shocks stems from the fact that the effects 
of the structural changes that these economies undergo overlap with those brought 
about by external causes, such as a shock to terms of trade for example. And this 
problem is going to persist in the near future as broad structural reform is still set to 
continue for some time in these countries. A solution to this problem could be provided 
by model simulations. However, the design of econometric models that would be able 
to produce a reasonable inflation forecast in any of the three countries has so far proved 
to be rather challenging.  
The NBH has initially been using the global model (NIGEM) of the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR). A Hungarian block was developed 
within the NIGEM which was then used for scenario analysis. More recently the NBH 
has developed a quarterly model, called NEM, which is used both for policy simulations 
and forecasting. Similarly, the CNB has been also using a small quarterly model for 
some time. The NBR uses a simple new-Keynesian model which is still in its early stages 
of development and testing. There have been several attempts to build models for 
forecasting inflation at the NBP (see, for example
17 Kokoszczynski et al., 2002 or Kllos, 
2002). But the conditional forecast of these models seems to have been falling short of 
expectations so far – as suggested by an ex-post comparison between realised end-year 
inflation against targets. This should not come as a surprise, as the likelihood that these 
models are mis-specified is rather high. Additionally, some of the estimated coefficients 
in the models’ equations could be biased. Kemme and Gavin (2004) have found that the 
forecasting processes in these countries yield superior results if coefficients obtained by 
a panel data estimation of the 15-EU countries are used instead. This seems to suggest 
that there is already a relative high level of economic integration between these three 
countries and the 15 countries that formed the EU before 1 May 2004.  
Another important observation pertains to inflation volatility. This – as 
measured by a rolling 12-month standard deviation – has tended to move in cycles and 
has not fallen considerably (see Fgure 4.4 below). 
A common feature of the IT countries seem in fact to be higher inflation 
volatility than non-IT countries. Although this observation is supported by findings in 
                                                 
15 Nominal income targeting has proved to be imprecise while price level targeting imposes more 
stringent restrictions on the behaviour of the central bank since any over/undershooting of the price 
level target will have to be subsequently corrected so as to hit the target implying a finite price level 
variance. This is in contrast to inflation targeting where the price level variance tends to infinity (see, for 
instance, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2002).   
16 Moreover, the participation in the ERM II mechanism conflicts with the IT principles since the 
monetary authority will have two objectives instead of one – as required by the IT framework. 
17 We are grateful to Marek Gruszczynski for providing us the links to those papers.   
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other papers,
18 the question that arises is whether such volatility is desirable. For 
instance, since the adopting of IT, inflation volatility has been quite high in Hungary.  
Secondly, there is the issue of multiple objectives. It is hard to believe that the 
authorities in transition economies would place a much lower emphasis on other 
macroeconomic variables such as economic growth or employment compared to 
inflation. 
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This is not to say that central bankers care only about inflation, in other words 
they are “inflation nutters” in Mervin King’s terminology. But the weights assigned to 
economic growth or employment for instance are bound to be higher in practice than 
the central bank would acknowledge. This is because, ultimately, higher unemployment 
could cause public dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policies which in 
turn may lead to macroeconomic instability. Already Socialist governments in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland have been losing support as they cut welfare and state 
jobs to meet EU requirements on deficits and debt. The prime ministers in all three 
countries have bowed to public pressure and have resigned since their countries joined 
the EU. And coalitions led by Socialists in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
suffered defeat in June 2004 European Parliament elections. This could add up to the 
pressure the central banks in these countries already face to pay more attention to 
economic growth.   
Moreover, there is an inherent unavoidable conflict caused by multiple 
objectives that lies ahead for all new EU members. All countries that intend to join the 
EMU (as all new EU members have to do so sooner or latter) are required first to spend 
a period of minimum two years in the ERM II. This means that the central bank will 
have to maintain a +/-15% exchange rate band around some predetermined central 
parity. But preserving the value of domestic currency against the euro within the band 
while, at the same time, targeting inflation could cause potential conflicts for the 
conduct of monetary policy. The experience of the NBH is illustrative in this respect. In 
                                                 
18 Levin et al. (2004) find that, while most of their developing countries in their sample succeeded in 
reducing the mean of inflation, the volatility of inflation remained quite high.     
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2003, in the aftermath of a speculative attack on the forint, the NBH was forced to shift 
the band the forint was trading in at that time. The NBH moved in strongly to defend 
the exchange rate band, spending some euro 5.3 billion or the equivalent of 7% of 
GDP. Apart from the spillover effects such actions might have,
19 they are bound to 
affect the credibility of monetary authorities. 
Thirdly, fiscal policy considerations play an important role in the evolution of 
inflation in transition economies. Although the design and implementation of monetary 
policy in all three countries lies ultimately with the central banks, other crucial elements 
of policy credibility such as the fiscal position play a decisive influence on inflation 
expectations. The pressure on budget deficits is likely to grow in the years to come as 
the EU accession costs will have to be added to the costs of reforming social security 
systems. The latest IMF country reports for all three countries suggest that fiscal policies 
are on unsustainable paths. Moreover, the level of public debt in Hungary and Poland is 
already close to the Maastricht limit of 60% of GDP. As a consequence, in 2004 both 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch rating agencies downgraded Poland’s domestic debt. 
Such actions can affect the credibility of fiscal policies and raise inflation expectations. 
For example, the two criteria used by Stone (2003) to measure policy credibility in a 
range of developing countries were the actual rate of inflation and the Standard and 
Poor’s long-term government debt ratings. On both counts the situation seems to get 
actually worse in Poland. In Hungary policy inconsistencies have weakened policy 
credibility, although in 2005 concerted efforts by the government and monetary 
authorities seemed to have reversed the trend somewhat. However, this could still be 
damaged if steps are not taken to achieve fiscal consolidation and contain the current 
account deficit (see Appendix 1).  
4.4 Individual Country Economic Issues in Brief 
Czech Republic. As stressed in the latest OECD Country Economic Survey
20 
and shown in Appendix 1, the government’s fiscal position deteriorated in 2005, being 
revised up from 2.6% to 3.6% of GDP. Fiscal discipline was weakened mainly by pre-
election spending commitments which pushed up deficit projections and increased 
speding ceilings of government’s Medium-term Expenditure Framework. The June 2006 
general election failed to deliver a clear majority to coalition groups and the ensuing 
political stalemate has already generated delays in implementing the much needed 
structural reforms for achieving fiscal stabilisation. Although the size of public debt is 
under control, aided also by the low level of interest rates, long term stabilisation of 
public budgets would pose a challenge to both monetary policy, to keep inflation under 
control, and the country’s strategy of joining the euro area. Moreover, high labour 
market rigidity prevents adjustment and impedes output stabilisation. Mainly because of 
these reasons, the monetary and fiscal authorities recommended the Czech government 
to avoid entry into the ERM II mechanism in 2006
21 acknowledging that the economy 
needs to achieve more flexibility before getting locked in the ERM II. The target date of 
                                                 
19 Foreign investors reacted to the NBH intervention in the foreign exchange markets by adopting 
different positions vis-à-vis other EE currencies. As a consequence, volatility of these currencies 
increased inducing more uncertainty. The movements in the Czech koruna against the euro provides a 
good example.    
20 Czech Republic OECD Economic Survey 2004. 
21 Inflation Report, National Bank of Czech Republic, January 2006.  
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joining the euro area by 2010 has been officially abandoned with no other date has been 
set so far.  
Hungary. Fiscal balances in Hungary indicate a strong link with the political 
business cycle and the April 2006 parliamentary elections proved this once again. In 
early 2006 the stimulatory effect on the economy caused by higher than expected 
government expenditure pushed the budget deficit above 10% of GDP (see Appendix 
1). The subsequent adoption of a fiscal austerity package is expected led to lower 
economic growth. On the other hand increases in VAT rates, aimed at raising 
government revenues, and energy prices has already pushed up annual inflation. 
Persistent high general government and current account deficits continue to call into 
question the sustainability of Hungary’s macroeconomic path. And this situation of twin 
deficits is likely to persist in the medium term (see data in Appendix 1). In its November 
2005 inflation report
22 the NBH acknowledged its limited influence on containing 
inflation pressures in the short and medium term. Uncertainties regarding both changes 
in external conditions as well as in domestic fiscal policy could lead to a radical 
alteration of the current monetary conditions and the factors that cause inflation. 
However, the timing and consequences of such influences on inflation are hard to 
predict, making it extremely difficult for the NBH to assign a high probability to a 
certain time path of inflation. Hungary’s current situation reflects both inconsistencies 
having multiple objectives – an inflation target and an exchange rate target – and 
government interference in decisions related to monetary policy.  
 
Poland. The lax stance of fiscal policy over the last years has led to a rapid 
accumulation of public debt which has already reached over 52% of GDP. Even with 
privatization revenues remaining at the same level, if fiscal policy is left unchanged the 
OECD simulations
23 show that public debt could expand at a rate of 5% a year in the 
medium term. The IMF projections
24 of a two-year slowdown in output by less than 3 
percent indicate that public debt could reach 75% of GDP by the end of the decade.
25 
The uncertainties surrounding future path of fiscal policy are seen as a major threat to 
inflation in the medium term. And missing inflation targets could damage the central 
bank’s credibility. This could be further dented by other operational aspects flaws such 
as conflicting signals from the MPC regarding inflation developments or uncertainties 
regarding future stance of monetary policy due to the MPC members nomination 
process. Although lately inflation undershot its target, this was mainly due to external 
developments and the fall in food prices, over which monetary policy had little control.    
Given further need for further structural adjustment it is not surprising that Poland did 
not move into ERM II in 2006.      
 
Romania. Following a substantial liberalization of the capital account by early 
2005, large foreign capital inflows have appreciated the domestic currency. Since then, 
over a period of one year, the RON has appreciated against the euro by around 18% 
                                                 
22 Quarterly Inflation Report, National Bank of Hungary, November 2005. 
23 OECD Economic Surveys, Poland, 2004. 
24 IMF Country Report No. 05/263, July 2005. 
25 This looks a remote possibility at the moment. Economic performance has been strong, reaching 5% in 
2006, and the prospects of a continuation of robust growth in 2007 and 2008 are high. However, public 
debt level is still close to Maastrich criteria and any slowdown in economic growth could push it above 
the 60% treshhold.    
 
Daniel Daianu and Laurian Lungu, Inflation Targeting, Between Rhetoric and Reality. The 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
57
aiding, to a large extent, the central bank’s efforts to bring inflation closer to the end-
year target. The appreciation of domestic currency is looming as a threat to productivity 
and might hamper growth in the period to come.
26 Fuelled by a relatively strong 
domestic demand the current account deficit went over 10% of GDP in 2006 and is 
likely to remain around this level in the short term. Although a restrictive fiscal policy 
has kept the budget deficit in check, this is likely to rise in the coming years, pushed up 
by the EU accession costs and pensions system reform. With inflation falling more 
rapidly than anticipated, at its first meeting in 2007 the MPC decided to cut its 
benchmark rate by 75 basis points to 8%. The NBR’s bold move tends to suggest two 
things. Firstly, that the interest rate channel is still weak. And secondly, that the NBR is 
concerned about the strong appreciation of the RON
27 – raising the question of multiple 
objectives.              
 
Slovakia. As stressed in the 2005 country’s OECD Economic Surveys the 
inflation transmission mechanism in Slovakia is dominated by the exchange rate channel 
with the interest rate and aggregate demand channels being relatively weak. In these 
circumstances any increase in inflation coupled with an appreciation of the exchange 
rate would confront the monetary policy authorities with a difficult choice, either to 
raise interest rates to dampen demand or cut them to curtail capital inflows. Over the 
last years the central bank has struggled to limit the upward pressure on the koruna 
caused by large FDI inflows, especially in the automobile manufacturing industry. 
Although the current level of exchange rate is perceived to be essentially sustainable, 
swings in inflation and nominal exchange rate could lead to changes in real exchange 
rate that might be misaligned with economic fundamentals. Since the country’s entry 
into the ERM II at the beginning of 2006, the exchange rate appreciated against the 
euro by 7%
28. In addition, pension system reform is estimated to add the equivalent of 
another 1.3-1.4% of GDP to the fiscal deficit which would push this to over 4% of 
GDP. 
Although economic conditions vary among IT countries, a common challenge 
for all of them is to exert some control over the exchange rate channel so that the 
specified inflation targets could be achieved without hindering economic growth. This is 
because the exchange rate channel dominates, to some extent, the inflation transmission 
mechanism in all these countries. However, uncertainties regarding the evolution of  
energy and commodity prices in international markets together with the need for further 
domestic structural and fiscal adjustment make the central banks’ task of controlling 
inflation in these countries more difficult.            
                                                 
26 Sustained heavy capital inflows, that have been induced by Romania’s EU accession in 2007, and high 
interest rate differentials (when it comes to speculative inflows), drive the appreciation of the domestic 
currency; this, further erodes Romanian firms’ competitiveness and can bring about a sort of a Dutch 
disease over the longer run. Migration helps mitigate the pains of adjustment, but the competitiveness 
challenge could only rise unless efficiency gains achieved by domestic companies are adequate. 
27 Economic growth was above 8% in 2006 and is forecast to be strong in the short term. Given recent 
comments by some NBR officials about the economy overheating, the interest rate cut cannot suggest 
but an increased attention by NBR to exchange rate behaviour.    
28 Economic policies are aimed at achieving Slovakia’s entry in the euro area in January 2009.  
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4.5 Is There a Better Alternative Monetary Policy? 
In hindsight it looks as if the IT experience in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland has had limited success so far. There have been several benefits to the adoption 
of IT, but these could, to a large extent, have equally been achieved by the 
implementation of alternative monetary policy regimes. Take for instance transparency 
and communication, the two main features hailed to be of great importance in an IT 
regime. They can be equally achieved under an exchange rate targeting regime. There is 
nothing that can stop the central banks from making public, periodically, their views on 
the economy while explaining the reasons for their actions. As, indeed, the Baltic 
countries and Bulgaria do to a large extent. In a race for a better understanding of their 
actions by the public, central banks’ websites in EE publish a lot of information.  
One major benefit of the IT regime in EE countries has been the publication of 
inflation reports – which present a comprehensive analysis of the current economic 
conditions and give useful insights regarding future policy actions.       
The question that arises is then what should be the alternative. A simple answer 
would be to follow an approach similar to the one employed by the ECB. Many 
empirical studies have shown that the ECB is not indifferent either to fluctuations in 
economic activity or the exchange rate. It seems that for a central bank, “flexibility” is 
an asset at least as important as “credibility”. 
An ECB-like system is likely to be a suitable regime. Under such an 
arrangement, the policymaker focuses on price stability too, but monetary policy 
management builds on the “just-do-it” principle. For small, still fragile economies, 
flexibility does not clash with credibility, to the contrary, both back each other.  
In EE countries, the CB’s pay a considerable attention to exchange rate 
developments. An ECB-like approach would allow them to do that without having to 
pursue multiple objectives. Defining a target range for inflation has proved to be a 
challenging task for all IT countries in EE. As figures 4.1- 4.3 show, all three countries, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have been, largely, missing their inflation targets. 
In more than seven years of IT Poland did not hit once its targets while Hungary and 
Czech Republic have had a poor performance in doing that. For EE countries an 
asymmetric IT target would probably be as challenging as a symmetric one. A feasible 
alternative would be a  simple statement for aggresively pursuing price stability without 
the specification of a target.     
The distinction between a flexible pursuit of an inflation target and a genuine IT 
regime is not merely semantic. The latter imposes stringent requirements on the central 
bank, and may be a very efficient device in the context of the developed economies; on 
the contrary, pretending to behave like these countries, while in reality retaining a large 
degree of flexibility is no better than communicating honestly on the “imperfect IT” 
system that is actually implemented. 
The recent experience with IT in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
poses the question whether a move towards a formal way of implementing IT would be 
beneficial for other countries that intend to join the EU in the near future. The answer 
will depend, of course, on the particular economic conditions that exist in each country. 
But there are a few remarks that are worth mentioning here. One of them relates to the 
level of euro(dollar)isation. Countries that had high levels of inflation in the past tend to 
be more euro(dollar)ised as the public sought to protect their savings in a more stable 
currency. In Romania, for example, ca. 33% of M2 is in foreign currency, mostly euros 
and US dollars. Croatia is another example of a highly euroised country where almost  
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70% of savings are denominated in foreign currency. A typical issue in these countries is 
the indexation of financial contracts either to the US dollar or euro. The 
euro(dollar)isation is bound to hamper the implementation process of IT here simply 
because the central banks have limited control over their money supply. A particular 
case is represented by the countries that adopted a currency board, like the Baltic 
countries (which are already EU members) or Bulgaria, for example. However, unless 
some significant large unexpected adverse shock that could make them abandon their 
current exchange rate arrangements happens, it is extremely unlikely that these countries 
will change their monetary policy framework before adopting the euro.  
Large interest rate differentials are another potential source of conflict with an 
IT regime. In the absence of capital account restrictions the domestic currency is bound 
to appreciate as foreign capital inflows move in to take advantage of higher returns. This 
should lead to an appreciation of domestic currency and put a downward pressure on 
the interest rates. But easier access to credit by domestic residents, which is in high 
demand in accession countries, could raise inflation expectations and it may adversely 
affect central bank’s efforts to target inflation.  
Also, a stronger currency will put additional pressure on the current account 
deficits.  In Romania and Bulgaria, for instance, these are already large and growing. 
Under such a scenario the adoption of IT will leave even less room for manoeuvre for 
fiscal authorities if the targets for inflation are not set in relation to government 
demands for fiscal consolidation. It is a well documented fact that government’s 
budgets in accession countries tend to be more under strain as EU accession costs add 
up to other expenses incurred, such as those related to pensions or health care reforms.                       
It is therefore essential that a central bank should not adopt a policy regime only 
for communication purposes or because it follows some policy fashion trends. A central 
bank should be concerned first and above all with credibility. And credibility will emerge 
if, over a long period, agreed targets – whatever they may be – are not missed.  
5.  Conclusions 
This paper examines the inflation targeting regime in the context of transition 
economies. However, the success of such a regime depends largely on the degree to 
which certain general requirements are met. The uncertainty surrounding the conditional 
forecasts, the inherent existence of multiple objectives for monetary policy together 
with other elements of policy credibility, such as fiscal policy, cast doubts that a formal 
IT can be adopted successfully in transition economies at the moment. The pre-
conditions for a formal IT impose a more rigid operating framework for monetary 
policy and leave less room for manœuvre for a central bank. By consistently missing 
inflation targets a central bank is likely to damage, sooner or latter, its credibility and this 
fact could have long-lasting consequences. It is relevant that some central banks have 
resorted to an eclectic (soft) form of inflation targeting, in view of the difficulties 
mentioned above. An alternative for these central banks is to adopt an ECB-like 
approach. This would not only help preserve their hard earned credibility achieved so 
far while allowing them the much desired flexibility in the implementation of monetary 
policy. But, since all these countries will join the EMU sooner or later, it also makes 
more sense for an accession country to adopt a monetary policy practice which 
resembles closely the one practiced by the ECB.  
 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
60 
In practice, however, this is unlikely to happen. The participation in the ERM II 
mechanism cannot be avoided unless a change in the Maastricht criteria occurs, which is 
quite improbable. Also, the announcement by a central bank of moving from an IT 
monetary policy regime towards an exchange rate target band is, again, unlikely to 
happen. Central banks in EE have invested some resources in striving to implement the 
IT regime and to influence the public’s inflation expectations. A change in the monetary 
policy framework now would be perceived by the public as a weakness of the central 
bank because of its inability to pursue IT. It is plausible that IT countries in EE will 
continue to implement their IT monetary policy framework until they join the euro area. 
However, de facto, the central banks that have adopted IT in EE could pursue an 
exchange rate targeting since their foreign exchange reserves levels would allow them to 
do so. Indeed, IT countries that intend to move into the ERM II, like Poland for 
instance, have already started to re-build their foreign exchange reserves. Such a 
measure is likely to be only a precautionary one if the economy is sufficiently resilient to 
shocks. However, as the experience of Hungary so far shows, implementing an IT 
regime while in the ERM II, could be a challenging task especially if macroeconomic 
fundamentals are not strong and the economy’s resilience to cope with external shocks 
is limited.                    
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List of Abbreviations Used in the Text: 
IT - Inflation Targeting 
ERM - Exchange Rate Mechanism 
EMU - European Monetary Union 
EU – European Union 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
CB – Central Bank 
ECB – European Central Bank 
BofE – Bank of England 
NBH - National Bank of Hungary 
NBP – National Bank of Poland 
MPC – Monetary Policy Committee 
EE – Eastern Europe 
BU – Bulgaria 
CR – Croatia 
Cz_R – Czech Republic 
ET – Estonia 
HU – Hungary 
LV- Latvia 
LT – Lithuania 
PO - Poland 
RO – Romania  
SK – Slovakia 
SL – Slovenia 
EU-12(13) - Eurozone 
UK – United Kingdom 
HCPI – Harmonised Consumer Price Index 
RPIX – Retail Price Index 
 
Appendix 1. Selected Macroeconomic Variables29  




Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
4a 
2003 -6.2  -8.7  -2.2  -6.2  -0.9 
2004 -5.2  -8.9  -4.3  -7.6  -3.6 
2005
  -2.1 -6.2  -1.7  -9.1  -8.7 
2006
*  -2.9 -7.3  -2.1  -10.6  -6.4 
2007
§  -2.0 -6.3  -1.9  -8.8  -3.9 
2008
§  -2.0 -5.6  -1.5  -8.5  -3.3 
*-estimated,  §-forecast. 
 




3c  Romania Slovakia 
2003 27.7  59.1  50.1  24.4  42.6 
2004 27.8  60.7  48.8  23.7  41.6 
2005
  28.4 59.9  52.3  20.5  34.5 
2006
*  28.9 59.9  54.4  21.0  38.4 
2007
§  29.8 59.9  56.7  22.5  37.8 
2008
§  29.9 59.9  57.1  23.1  37.9 
 
                                                 
29 Data Sources: IMF Country Reports, OECD Country Economic Surveys, central banks websites.  
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Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
4e 
2003 -6.0  -7.2  -5.9  -2.4  -3.7 
2004 -4.0  -5.4  -6.1  -1.2  -4.3 
2005
  -3.6 -7.8  -4.3  -0.8  -3.1 
2006
*  -3.7 -10.1  -4.1  -1.7  -3.7 
2007
§  -4.1 -6.9  -3.8  -2.8  -2.7 
2008
§  -4.3 -6.7  -3.6  -3.0  -2.2 
 









Hungary Poland  Romania  Slovakia 
2003 7.8 5.9 20.0  7.2  17.5 
2004 8.3 6.2 19.1  6.2  18.1 
2005
  8.0 7.3 17.7  5.9  16.2 
2006
*  7.3 7.5 14.3  5.2  13.5 
2007
§  6.8 7.7 12.6  5.1  12.2 
2008
§  6.3 7.6 11.3  4.9  11.7 